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This paper surveys the empirical analyses that examine the effects of 
the Bank of Japan’s (BOJ’s) quantitative easing policy (QEP), which was
implemented from March 2001 through March 2006. The survey confirms
a clear effect whereby the commitment to maintain the QEP fostered the
expectations that the zero interest rate would continue into the future,
thereby lowering the yield curve centering on the short- to medium-term
range. There were also phases in which an increase in the current account
balances held by financial institutions at the BOJ bolstered this expec-
tation. While the results were mixed as to whether expansion of the 
monetary base and altering the composition of the BOJ’s balance sheet 
led to portfolio rebalancing, generally this effect, if any, was smaller than
that stemming from the commitment. When viewing the QEP’s impact 
on Japan’s economy through various transmission channels, many of the
analyses suggest that the QEP created an accommodative environment 
in terms of corporate financing. In particular, the QEP contained finan-
cial institutions’ funding costs from the market and staved off financial
institutions’ funding uncertainties. The QEP’s effect on raising aggregate
demand and prices was often limited, due largely to the then progressing
corporate balance-sheet adjustment, as well as the zero bound constraint 
on interest rates.
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A. The Quantitative Easing Policy (QEP): Overview
Japan’s economy experienced prolonged stagnation following the burst of the asset
price bubble in the early 1990s, despite several short-lived recovery phases. During
this period, general prices measured by the consumer price index (CPI) gradually
reduced their growth rate, followed by a continuous and modest decline from 1998 to
the autumn of 2005. Over this period, the CPI dropped by a total of about 3 percentage
points (Figure 1). In addition, the broad-based influence of the generation and bursting
of the bubble spread to firms and financial institutions.
In this economic environment and as Japan’s economy headed toward recession 
triggered by the bursting of the global IT bubble, on March 19, 2001 the Bank of 
Japan (BOJ) adopted a new monetary easing framework, the so-called quantitative 
easing policy (QEP), with a view to stemming the continuous price decline and setting
the basis for sustainable economic growth. The QEP under a zero interest rate, a 
policy unprecedented worldwide, consisted mainly of three pillars: 
(1) to change the main operating target for money market operations from the
uncollateralized overnight call rate to the outstanding current account balances
(CABs) held by financial institutions at the BOJ, and provide ample liquidity
to realize a CAB target substantially in excess of the required reserves;
(2) to make the commitment that the above ample liquidity provision would 
continue to stay in place until the CPI (excluding perishables, hereafter “core
CPI”) registered stably at zero percent or an increase year on year; and 
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Notes: 1. Real GDP figures previous to and including fiscal 1994 are based on 
referential series.
2. CPI (excluding fresh food) figures are adjusted to exclude the effects 
of consumption tax hikes.
Sources: Cabinet Office, “Annual Report on National Accounts”; Ministry of Internal
Affairs and Communications, “Consumer Price Index.”(3) to increase the amount of outright purchases of long-term Japanese govern-
ment bonds (JGBs), up to a ceiling of the outstanding balance of banknotes
issued, should the BOJ consider such an increase to be necessary for providing
liquidity smoothly.
The transition of the QEP started in March 2001 with a CAB target of ¥5 trillion,
a level higher than the required reserve level of ¥4 trillion.
1 The target was then 
progressively raised in response to the deterioration of the economy, and was left
unchanged until the BOJ exited the QEP after the target was raised in January 2004
to ¥30 trillion to ¥35 trillion. Reflecting the ample liquidity provision under the QEP,
the uncollateralized overnight call rate declined to 0.001 percent, a level below the
0.02–0.03 percent that was realized from 1999 to 2000 under the zero interest rate
policy (ZIRP). To meet smoothly the CAB target, the BOJ gradually increased its
purchases of long-term JGBs from the initial pace of ¥400 billion per month, and set
the amount at ¥1,200 billion per month beginning in October 2002. As of the end of
2005, the BOJ provided a monetary base
2 worth ¥117 trillion, as its liability, in the
form of CABs and cash. On the asset side, the BOJ’s holdings of long-term JGBs
reached ¥63 trillion. Furthermore, from July 2003 to March 2006, as a limited-time
measure, the BOJ purchased asset-backed securities with a view to supporting the
development of the asset-backed securities market and strengthening the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy.
3 The BOJ further clarified its commitment (item [2]
of the commitment above) in October 2003.
4 While the BOJ was also committed
during 1999–2000 under the ZIRP to “continue the ZIRP until deflationary concern
is dispelled,” the commitment of the QEP differed from that of the ZIRP in that it
linked the commitment with the actual track record of the CPI.
The core CPI growth turned positive from November 2005, and the rate for
January 2006 announced in early March was 0.5 percent. On March 9, 2006, the
BOJ stated that the year-on-year growth in the core CPI was expected to remain 
positive, and judged that the conditions laid out in the commitment under the QEP
had been fulfilled. Consequently, the BOJ exited the QEP and decided to change the
operating target of money market operations back to the uncollateralized overnight
call rate, and to encourage the rate to remain at effectively zero percent.
B. Purposes of This Paper
The QEP generated extensive debate both in Japan and abroad even before its adop-
tion. For example, there was active debate over whether the BOJ should increase funds
3
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1. For details, see the Appendix.
2. The monetary base is the sum of the BOJ CABs, banknotes, and coins in circulation (although in a strict sense, coins
in circulation are not included in the BOJ’s liabilities), and it is a concept that synthesizes the currency provided by
the BOJ.
3. Other than these measures, the BOJ determined to purchase stocks held by commercial banks from October 2002
to end-September 2003, to overcome the nonperforming-loan (NPL) problem and ensure financial system stability.
4. Specifically, the BOJ clarified that its commitment to maintaining the QEP until the CPI registered stably zero 
percent or an increase year on year was underpinned by two conditions: the recent core CPI should register zero 
percent or above over a few months on average, and the prospective core CPI would not be expected to register below
zero percent. In addition, the BOJ stated that these conditions were the necessary conditions, and there might be
cases in which the BOJ judged it appropriate from an economic and price standpoint to continue with the QEP even
if these two conditions were fulfilled.provision beyond interest rate manipulation when the BOJ adopted the ZIRP in
1999.
5 Furthermore, debates continued after the BOJ adopted the QEP, ranging 
from what effects could be expected from the QEP and whether the BOJ should 
further increase the CABs to exit from deflation to whether new measures should be
introduced.
6 At the Monetary Policy Meeting that decided on the introduction of 
the QEP, the BOJ revealed, upon referring that the effects of an increase in quantity
were uncertain, that the Bank would “continue examining what would be the effects 
of increasing the outstanding balance of current accounts at the Bank as well as the 
possibility of a further easing through an increase in the outstanding balance.”
7 While
these debates have yet to reach any theoretical or empirical consensus, the data obtained
and theoretical and empirical research conducted during the five-year period of the
QEP nevertheless seem to have gradually converged with the views in academia.
Meanwhile, the BOJ assessed the effects of the QEP in its October 2005 Outlook for
Economic Activity and Prices as follows:
8
When there were strong concerns over the stability of the financial system, 
the ample provision of liquidity by the Bank, which met financial institutions’
liquidity demand, stabilized financial markets and maintained accommodative
financial conditions, and contributed to averting a contraction in economic
activity. In financial markets, the Bank’s ample provision of liquidity pushed
short-term interest rates to practically zero percent. Longer-term interest rates
have stably remained at low levels because the commitment by the Bank has led
the market to expect that short-term interest rates will remain at zero percent
when prices continue to decline slightly.
9
To reach such an assessment, various empirical analyses have been conducted within
and outside the BOJ. Arguably, several difficult issues are involved in gauging the effects
of the QEP compared with those of normal interest rate policy. For example, there is a
need to differentiate the effects associated with lowering the policy rate to zero and
those manifested through expectations and changes in monetary aggregate indicators.
In addition, there are constraints in that there has never been any previous experience
of the QEP either in Japan or abroad. Given such constraints, the stock of empirical
research is not necessarily sufficient at this juncture. Nevertheless, it is useful to survey
the previous empirical analyses.
10
This paper examines the previous empirical analyses on the effects of the QEP by
specifying the transmission channels through which the effects work and identifying
their magnitudes, and by capturing the QEP’s overall effects on the economy. First,
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5. For detailed discussions, see Bernanke (2000), Iwata (2000), Kuttner and Posen (2001), Svensson (2001), Okina
(1999a, b), McKinnon (1999), Meltzer (1999a), and Oda and Okina (2001).
6. Such discussions are presented in Svensson (2003), Coenen and Wieland (2003), Bernanke (2003), Iwata (2001),
Fukao (2002), Shirakawa (2002), and Komiya (2002).
7. Bank of Japan (2001, p. 80).
8. Fukui (2006) also assesses the effects of the QEP.
9. Bank of Japan (2006a, pp. 63–64).
10. In the latter stage of the QEP, Ueda (2005) tried to summarize Japan’s monetary policy under a zero bound 
constraint of interest rates.this paper examines the transmission mechanism of the QEP’s effects. The effects are
classified into three types based on operational measures, and three questions are posed
for the effects through each specific transmission channel.
11 The first question is, among
the effects of the QEP, what is the extent of the effect of the commitment to maintain
the QEP on the expected future path of short-term interest rates observed (Section
II.A). The second question is through which channel and to what extent are the effects
of expanding the size of the BOJ’s balance sheet by increasing the CABs identified
(Section II.B). The third question is through which channel and to what extent are the
effects of altering the composition of the BOJ’s balance sheet by increasing purchases of
long-term JGBs identified (Section II.C). The reason why one can consider the effects
of the QEP in these three classifications based on operational measures is that each
operational measure is not necessarily a precondition for the other operational measure
to become effective, and this makes it possible to grasp the effects independently. For
example, the commitment referred to in the first question could be fulfilled just by
committing to maintain a zero interest rate over time even if the BOJ did not provide
ample liquidity far in excess of the required reserves. Altering the composition of 
the BOJ’s balance sheet, referred to in the third question, could take place without
expanding the size of the balance sheet through an increase in the purchase of 
long-term JGBs and a decrease in the purchase of short-term JGBs.
12 In taking up the
effects according to individual operational measures, this paper adopts the approach of
judging whether the transmission channels exist by measuring the extent of the effects
on the yields of various financial assets in financial and capital markets.
The paper then reviews the extent to which the QEP affected the economy through
the identified transmission mechanism. Specifically, the paper poses several questions
with respect to the comprehensive effects of the QEP. The first question is whether the
QEP had the effect of containing the financial system uncertainty that had destabilized
the economy (Section III.A). This question is asked because financial system uncer-
tainty is considered to have played some role, while opinions vary as to the extent,
behind the prolonged stagnation of Japan’s economy from the 1990s, and that further
deterioration of financial system uncertainty could have, through contraction of 
business activity, sharply worsened the economic and price situation. The second 
question is to what extent the QEP contributed to raising aggregate demand and 
prices (Section III.B). If the analyses indicate that this effect in raising aggregate
demand and prices was weak, the paper will consider whether that was because the
transmission channel itself was weak or because Japan’s economic structure had
become less sensitive to monetary easing amid mounting adjustment pressures. Finally,
the paper summarizes the conclusions that emerge from the survey, and points out
issues for future research (Section IV).
Figure 2 presents a conceptual diagram of the transmission channels and effects of
the QEP on which the examinations in the following sections are based.
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11. There are several possible ways to classify the transmission channels of the policy effects; the classification adopted
here is consistent with that in Bernanke and Reinhart (2004). While various paths in terms of economic theory
could have been weaved into each classification, the judgment here is that the most useful way is to link the policy
effects with the policy measures. 
12. However, there might be a case where increasing the quantity of CABs could not be achieved without an increase
in the purchase of long-term JGBs.II. Transmission Channels of QEP Effects
A. Effect of the Commitment
1. Theoretical channel from the commitment, and verification
The most important transmission channel of the commitment to “maintain the QEP
until the core CPI registers stably zero percent or an increase year on year” was to 
foster the expectation among the private sector that short-term interest rates would be 
maintained at zero percent until the inflation rate fulfilled this condition in the future.
In other words, this effect was meant, when present short-term interest rates were 
facing a zero bound constraint, to guide the private sector to expect that the zero 
interest rate would be maintained until the conditions of the commitment were 
satisfied even if the economy picked up in the future, thereby stimulating the economy
by lowering the present short- to medium-term interest rates. The actual developments
in the short- to long-term interest rates are shown in Figure 3. The reasons why it was
possible for the yield curve to reflect expectations that zero interest rates would be
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Figure 2  Effects of the QEP: Conceptual Diagram
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Note: The magnitude of the effects shown by the arrows reflects the results of empirical
analyses discussed later in the paper.maintained for some time even after the economy entered a recovery phase were
because the market (1) expected that the QEP would only be lifted when the published
core CPI growth exceeded zero percent,
13 and (2) considered that the CPI tends to
respond to real economic indicators with a certain lag. 
This idea is shown in the conceptual diagram (Figure 4), which is a modified 
version of the idea presented in Reifschneider and Williams (2000). Figure 4 [1] shows
the development of policy interest rates. When reducing the policy interest rate in
response to the deterioration of the economy and prices at the present moment (time
= 0), that rate faces a zero bound constraint in the fourth quarter. Subsequently, even
if the policy rate is held at zero, the economy in practice faces a situation in which 
monetary easing is lacking. To compensate for this, for example, the central bank makes
a commitment in the fourth quarter that it will maintain monetary easing by not 
raising the policy rate even when the economy and prices enter a recovery phase, a 
situation that warrants a raise in the policy rate under normal policy rules, in the 12th
quarter. Through such a commitment, the central bank mitigates the shortage of 
monetary easing under the zero interest rate bound, and returns to the policy rate 
desirable under normal conditions at a point when monetary easing would not 
excessively overheat the economy and price developments. If the central bank can 
preemptively convince the private sector of such a policy stance, then, as shown in
Figure 4 [2], long-term interest rates will decline by factoring in this expected path of
7
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Sources: Bloomberg; Bank of Japan.
13. This is because the CPI commitment requires not only that the published core CPI growth rate should be zero 
or above on average for several months, but also that the prospective core CPI growth should not be expected to
register below zero percent.future short-term interest rates, and this results in generating a further a monetary 
easing effect following the fourth quarter, when the policy rate hits zero. The monetary
easing effect explained here has often been referred to as the “policy duration effect”
(Ueda [2002]), focusing on the effect on the yield curve.
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Figure 4  Conceptual Diagram of the Effects of the Zero Interest Rate Commitment
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Note: Traditional interest rate policy is optimal discretionary policy that does not take into
account the zero bound constraint.Studies that explicitly advocate effects that utilize expectations under the zero
interest rate bound as economic theory can first be found in Krugman (1998, 2000).
Almost overlapping with the advent of this discussion, the BOJ also adopted for the
first time a policy aimed at factoring in the market expectation that monetary easing
would be maintained over time by explaining that the BOJ would “continue the ZIRP
until deflationary concern is dispelled” in launching the ZIRP in 1999. Krugman
stated that additional monetary easing would lose its effectiveness when interest rates
are almost zero percent and that thus the monetary base and bonds become perfect
substitutes, and he judged that Japan’s economy had fallen into such a liquidity trap.
14
He argued that the level of the natural rate of interest had become negative in Japan,
and, given the decline in prices, there would be no easing effects even if the BOJ 
temporarily increased the money stock, because nominal interest rates could not be
reduced below zero percent. He argued that a permanent increase in the money stock
would raise inflation expectations and thus increase current spending, enabling the
economy to exit from the liquidity trap. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) refined the
argument from the framework of New Keynesian economics,
15 and proposed that
even if the economy tumbles into a liquidity trap, the commitment to expand the
economy and tolerate inflation when the natural rate of interest turns positive at a 
certain point in the future would stimulate aggregate demand and mitigate defla-
tionary pressures. Both views, while differing in operational measures, have aspects
similar to the BOJ’s idea of commitment in that they borrow future monetary easing
effects from after the economic recovery in advance.
16
Bearing these considerations in mind, this paper considers the transmission
process of the policy duration effect by examining empirical analyses on the range of
the downward shift of the yield curve, from the viewpoint of the extent to which
future short-term interest rates were expected to decline compared with what had
been expected under normal monetary policy management. If such an effect were 
present, it not only lowered the anticipated value of the expected future path of 
short-term interest rates, but also, in theory, reduced the private sector’s uncertainty 
in expectations of the future course of monetary policy. This point is also examined 
by checking whether there was any reduction in the term premiums of interest rates.
Next, the paper compares the strength of the QEP’s commitment with that of the
ZIRP, which was adopted from 1999 to 2000. In considering the strength of the effect
of the commitment on the formation of private-sector expectations, the extent of 
history dependence whereby the central bank determines current policy in relation to
9
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14. Miyao (2006) examines in detail how the arguments of Krugman (1998) can be applied to Japan’s case.
15. Even in the framework of New Keynesian economics, which deals with the private sector’s optimizing behavior
and forward-looking expectations underpinned by price rigidity, the central bank’s optimal commitment policy—
under which the central bank determines the future policy path by taking into account all economic developments
and policy effects under the zero interest rate bound and conducts policy by assuming that the private sector will
behave by factoring in such a policy path—would entail features such as that the timing of the exit from a zero
interest rate depends on past inflation rates and GDP gaps, and it would lag the timing when the natural interest
rate has returned to positive territory (Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe [2005]). This effect implies that the central
bank “borrows” future monetary easing (Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe [2005]).
16. For example, Krugman (1998) also argued that, when viewing monetary policy in terms of nominal interest rates,
one way to raise the inflation rate in an economy confronting a liquidity trap is for the central bank to promise not
to raise interest rates even if the economy has started to expand and prices have started to rise. past economic conditions becomes a key. In theory, if there is a forward-looking 
element included in inflation expectations, a commitment that adequately incorporates
history dependence could strengthen the private sector’s formation of expectations
about future monetary easing more than a commitment without history dependence.
History-dependent monetary policy is, quite unlike its literal image, a policy that tries
to strengthen its effect on future expectations by strengthening the link between 
current and future policy through history dependence.
The BOJ’s QEP could be interpreted as history dependent in that it tried to 
compensate to some extent for the shortage of monetary easing under the zero interest
bound constraint by committing to future monetary easing while linking the policy
with the previous several months’ average CPI performance. Of course, it might not
have as strong a history dependence as price level targeting, which requires the central
bank to completely recover the price level that has diverged from the past target, 
or what New Keynesian economics assumes in the so-called optimal commitment.
However, it should be noted that the optimal extent of history dependence concern-
ing prices depends partly on the actual strength of inertia of price changes such 
as inflation and deflation. Price level targeting could lead to a one-time substantial
overshoot of prices and GDP gap if there is such inertia as prices continue to rise (fall)
reflecting past price developments once they begin to rise (fall). In the case of Japan,
the hypothesis that there is no inertia in price changes is not supported empirically. 
It has been generally pointed out that, in cases where such inertia exists, it would be
desirable for a central bank from the viewpoint of maximizing economic welfare to
aim at partial trend-reversion of the price level to reduce overshooting even as it takes
history dependence into account, rather than imposing strong history dependence
like price level targeting (Steinsson [2003] and Kimura and Kurozumi [2004]). One
specific example of partial adjustment is average inflation targeting, which targets the
backward-moving average of inflation rates from the past several periods up to the
present (Kimura and Kurozumi [2004]). Given that the BOJ’s commitment entailed a
condition to maintain the QEP until the core CPI growth became equal to or above
zero percent on average over several months, it could be interpreted to have, from the
limited viewpoint of history dependence, an effect on expectations similar to average
inflation targeting. 
The QEP had clarity in that the commitment was expressed numerically. The extent
to which the central bank was expected by the private sector to cautiously judge the trend
based on the backward-moving CPI average affected the extent of monetary easing.
In contrast, while the commitment under the ZIRP adopted during 1999–2000 is
also interpreted as one type of policy duration effect (Ueda [2005]), it is pointed out
that this commitment was linked to the future economic outlook and thus did not
have history dependence (Watanabe and Iwamura [2004]). In addition, the commit-
ment of the ZIRP entailed ambiguity in that it was not expressed numerically (Ueda
[2002]). Bearing these things in mind, this paper also compares the strength of both
commitments in light of empirical analyses.
2. Verification method and results
Empirical analyses about how the commitment to maintain the QEP linked to the
core CPI actually affected the yield curve can be found in Babaet al. (2005), Oda and
10 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MARCH 2007Ueda (2005), Marumo et al. (2003), and Okina and Shiratsuka (2004). All these
papers use the approach of decomposing yield curves derived from JGB yields or 
yen-swap interest rates to try and extract the effects of the commitment. Here, even
when the yield curve declines, it is important to distinguish whether that resulted
from the effect of the BOJ’s commitment which was perceived to have an easing
effect, or if it merely reflected spreading expectations that deflation would persist.
Babaet al. (2005) combine a small macro-structural model—which formulates the
expected future path of short-term interest rates by using a modified Taylor rule with
a zero bound constraint on the interest rate—with an interest-rate term structure
model based on the no-arbitrage condition to develop a macro-finance model. By
using this model, they derive the effect of the commitment to maintain a zero interest
rate on the yield curve calculated from JGB yields as the difference between the 
estimated expected future path of short-term interest rates under the actual yield curve
with the commitment, and the estimated expected future path of short-term interest
rates under the virtual yield curve without the commitment. The results show that 
the differential for three-year and five-year bond yields increased after the second half
of 2002. This difference increased conspicuously from 2003, to reach a maximum 
of 0.4–0.5 percent, and of about 0.2 percent for the 10-year bond yield. As an inter-
pretation of these results, the authors suggest that, rather than during periods when
the market appears extremely pessimistic about the economic outlook, it is during
periods such as that since 2003 when the economy has gradually recovered and the 
possibility that interest rates will be raised within several years increases that the effect
of the CPI-linked commitment strengthens. The authors also point out the possibility
that the differential for the 10-year bond yield did not increase as much as those of
medium-term bond yields because the market might have expected that the future
inflation rate would become higher due to the effect of lowering the yield curve.
Furthermore, a certain allowance should be attached to the levels of estimated results
owing partly to the assumption of the model, such as the robustness of the natural 
rate of interest.
In addition to the expected future path of short-term interest rates, the authors
measure how the effect of the commitment reduced the term premium of interest
rates by reducing uncertainty with respect to the future course of monetary policy.
This effect was detected from 2003/II for the three-year bond yield in terms of the
difference between the risk premium components of the yield curves with and with-
out the commitment. However, the difference for previous periods and the cases for
five- and 10-year bond yields were not obvious. These results are consistent with the
logical inference that uncertainty about the duration of the zero interest rate should 
virtually disappear in the distant future when the QEP is most likely to have been lifted.
Marumo et al. (2003) construct a term-structure yield curve model with the 
short-term interest rates following the traditional Vasicek (1977) model, which
assumes that the instantaneous spot rate follows the mean-reverting process and a 
normal distribution for errors, augmented by incorporating the probability of policy
duration of the ZIRP, with the long-term interest rates being adjusted by risk prices
perceived in the markets. Monthly data from January 1992 to January 1999 were used
for the model estimate. By treating the duration of the ZIRP as a stochastic variable
11
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on data after 1999, they find that it grew longer following adoption of the QEP
toward the end of 2002.
Okina and Shiratsuka (2004) break down the forward rate derived from daily
euroyen and yen swap interest rates data by using an extended version of the Nelson
and Siegel (1987) model, and estimate how the length of the policy duration effect
changes in different phases. They show that the policy duration effect strengthened
once in the first half of 2001 when the QEP was adopted, and strengthened again
from the spring of 2002, and estimate the expected duration of the policy to be some
2.5 years as of the end of 2002. Contrary to Baba et al. (2005), Okina and Shiratsuka
(2004) attribute the strengthening of the effect to the strengthening of market partici-
pants’ expectations that deflation would be protracted for years given the decline in
average long-term forward rates, on which the policy duration effect would have little
impact. The difference in these papers’ interpretations may turn on whether the
empirical analyses fully include the data for 2003. 
Based on the above-mentioned empirical analyses, this paper now proceeds to com-
pare the strength of the commitment effect under the QEP with that under the ZIRP,
and to check whether the core CPI commitment had a stronger effect on lowering the
yield curve than the commitment linked to dispelling future deflationary concerns. 
Baba et al. (2005) and Oda and Ueda (2005) calculate the expected core CPI
growth rates that the market expected the central bank to judge as satisfying the 
commitment, and find that those rates remained only slightly positive during the
ZIRP period, but then gradually rose during the QEP period to reach about 1 percent
from 2003, suggesting a considerable easing of expectations. This implies a strong
effect of the commitment on the expected future path of short-term interest rates
under the QEP. In addition, the decrease in the yield curve was apparently greater
under the QEP than under the ZIRP. Okina and Shiratsuka (2004) show that while
expectations of the duration of zero interest rates only lengthened to about six months
during the ZIRP period, they extended by more than one year over the course of the
QEP. In addition, during the QEP period, the average expected short-term interest
rates when the zero interest rate policy was expected to continue were lower than 
during the ZIRP period, and remained stable until 2003. Aside from this literature,
Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004) also conduct an examination using a macro-
finance model similar to that of Baba et al. (2005). They show that, during the 
periods immediately after the adoption of the ZIRP and QEP, the actual yield curves
became lower than the expected yield curves estimated from past economic variables
under a zero bound constraint on interest rates.
17
Consequently, every empirical analysis detects the effect whereby the QEP’s com-
mitment linked to actual core CPI performance lowered the yield curve, centering on
the short to medium term. And this effect was stronger than under the ZIRP com-
mitment linked to future dispelling of deflationary concerns. These results are almost
the same among all the analyses (Table 1). 
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17. It should be noted that Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004) did not specify the effect through which channel
lowered the yield curve in the case of the QEP. In combination with their separate event study under the QEP, they
withheld their conclusions as to whether the QEP had any effects other than lowering interest rates to zero.B. Effects of Expanding the Size of the BOJ’s Balance Sheet
1. Theoretical channels from the increase in CABs at the BOJ, and verification
This section examines the effects of repeated increases in CABs at the BOJ, as shown
in Figure 5, as well as those of the associated increase in the monetary base in light of
the specific transmission channels.
Since these transmission channels’ specific mechanisms have not gained consensus
in economic theory, their effects are difficult to verify. In particular, under monetary
policy theories with a micro foundation such as New Keynesian economics, which have
been receiving increasing support in academia, the interest rates of financial assets are
derived as the expected future path of short-term interest rates, and mechanisms that
generate premiums and their effects on the economy are not consistently addressed.
Applying this idea to monetary policy under the zero bound constraint on nominal
interest rates is the “irrelevance proposition for open-market operations” (Eggertsson
and Woodford [2003]). The irrelevance proposition, under certain assumptions, states
that under zero nominal interest rates neither an increase in the monetary base nor
diversification of the central bank’s measures to supply it (that is, the nature of the assets
the central bank purchases through open market operations) have any effect on the
equilibrium of the economy. If this proposition holds, a policy to increase the CABs 
or monetary base would have no effect on the economy. To verify the effects from the
increase in the CABs, let us see to what extent this proposition appears in practice, 
and if some effects could be expected.
For this proposition to hold true, two assumptions are necessary: (1) the marginal
utility to the representative agent of additional income does not depend on the 
variance in financial asset prices, in other words, does not depend on the aggregate
payoff of its asset portfolio, and (2) an increase in the monetary base or diversification
of central bank operational measures to supply it at present does not influence the
expected future conduct of monetary or fiscal policy. When the CABs at the BOJ are
increased, a portfolio rebalancing effect will be expected if (1) does not hold, and 
13
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Table 1  Policy Duration Effect of the QEP
Effect in lowering the yield  Comparison with 
curve from the policy  Effect in containing  policy duration effect
duration effect policy uncertainty under the ZIRP
Babaet al. (2005)
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2002. About 2.5 years at the 
end of 2002.)
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after policy adoptionthe effect of altering private-sector expectations regarding future monetary or fiscal
policy will appear if (2) does not hold.
While the definition might differ among analysts, the portfolio rebalancing effect
is often considered to be an effect whereby the reduction in the private portfolio risk
through central bank operations generates room for private-sector entities, which
behave to maximize their objective function subject to containing total risk below 
a certain limited amount, to take new risks, and thus part of the monetary base 
is exchanged for some type of risk asset (Oda and Okina [2001]). Whether this 
effect exists or not depends on whether the assumption of the utility function of the
representative agent in the irrelevance proposition is valid or not.
Under a view that advocates assumption (1) (Eggertsson and Woodford [2003]),
the interest rate becomes zero when the real money balance exceeds a certain threshold
(satiation level), and the marginal utility gained from liquidity service due to money
provision becomes zero. In other words, this view considers that when the interest rate
becomes zero, the additional provision of real money does not affect the utility of 
the representative agent. Based on this view, portfolio rebalancing would not occur 
in principle no matter how much the monetary base is increased when short-term
interest rates are already at zero. In addition, as long as the representative agent’s utility
does not depend on the financial assets’ price variance, the representative agent will
not adjust its portfolio even if the central bank reduces the interest rate variance by
exchanging parts of the monetary base for financial asset holdings, which are an
14 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MARCH 2007






































































Source: Bank of Japan (2006b).imperfect substitute for the monetary base. Because the portfolio rebalancing effect
would be theoretically rejected, proponents of this viewpoint do not attempt to
empirically verify this effect in the first place.
In contrast, if the assumption of its utility and budget constraint is relaxed, there is
room for the portfolio rebalancing effect to take place. Even so, there would be no
effect if the central bank were to increase the monetary base by purchasing short-term
government bonds, which are an almost perfect substitute for the monetary base under
zero interest rates.
18 However, there is a view that, even when short-term interest rates
become zero and the monetary base and short-term JGBs become a perfect substitute,
given the existence of many financial assets that are not perfect substitutes for the 
monetary base, raising the prices of imperfect substitute assets could generate a 
monetary easing effect even under zero interest rates (McCallum [2000, 2003]) and
others).
19 There are two views about which component of the premium of yields of
financial assets that are imperfect substitutes the portfolio rebalancing could affect.
Bearing in mind the two views that draw attention to the imperfect substitutability of
financial assets, the paper now proceeds to verify the past empirical research to identify
whether such portfolio rebalancing effects exist, focusing on the effects on the yields 
of various financial assets.
The first view is that portfolio rebalancing works through a mechanism whereby
the monetary base supply alters the supply-demand relationship of various financial
assets, thereby raising their prices (reducing their premiums) (Meltzer [1995, 1999b,
2001]).
20 Since this interpretation does not take into account what economic funda-
mentals would change behind that, the component of the premiums that changes is
not specified. This reduction of premiums is understood to affect business fixed
investment through changes in stock prices, which leads to changes in Tobin’s q, and
consumption through the wealth effect.
The second view theorizes imperfect substitutability among financial assets from
the viewpoint of the liquidity premium. Namely, since there is a qualitative difference
in terms of liquidity between money, which is always usable, and bonds or capital,
only a portion of which can be liquidated at one time, the exchange between them
could increase the liquidity of the private sector (Yates [2003]).
21 In addition, there is
the view that the cost of lost liquidity from the purchase of long-term bonds and the
transaction costs stemming from trading long-term bonds adds premiums onto the
term structure of interest rates (Andrés, López-Salido, and Nelson [2004]). Under 
the concepts presented by Kiyotaki and Moore (2001), the supply of the monetary base
mitigates liquidity constraints by altering the amount of liquidity in the economy, and
is thus expected to reduce liquidity premiums, bring changes in the flow of funds
from a savings entity to an investing entity, and thereby stimulate investment. Under
15
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18. McCallum (2001) notes that for the central bank to conduct open market operations under zero interest rates by
exchanging monetary base for short-term government bonds, which, at the margin, become perfect substitutes,
would be like replacing US$1 billion worth of US$5 bills with US$1 billion worth of US$10 bills, which, to an
approximation, has no effect.
19. Other than altering the prices of financial assets that are not perfect substitutes for the monetary base, there is an
argument for considering the portfolio-rebalancing effects in a broader context, from the viewpoint that money
has different functions. See Section III.A.
20. Mishkin (1995) referred to such effects identified by Meltzer as “asset price effects.”
21. The theoretical background is according to Kiyotaki and Moore (2001).the concepts advocated by Andrés, López-Salido, and Nelson (2004), economic activity
will be stimulated through a decline in long-term interest rates rather than rates 
estimated from the expected future path of short-term interest rates.
Next, in considering whether assumption (2) of the irrelevance proposition holds,
this paper specifically examines the issue of whether an increase in the monetary base
or diversification of measures to supply this monetary base through market operations
at present would affect the private sector’s expectations on the future course of mone-
tary policy. As shown in the Appendix, when the BOJ raised its CAB target, in many
cases it cited preventing deterioration of the economy and price declines as reasons for
the raise. If increases in the CABs or monetary base actually make the private sector
expect that monetary easing will continue longer than previously envisaged, these
increases will reduce present nominal long-term interest rates (Meyer [2001]). In the
following subsection, this paper reviews empirical analyses that attempt to determine
whether the QEP’s easing effects were strengthened because the implementation of the
commitment to maintain the QEP was endorsed in the visible format of an increase in
the CABs. The analysis here is considered to augment the policy duration effect of the
commitment surveyed in Section II.A.
As another channel not discussed so far, effects through the fiscal channel have been
noted. This is the assertion that when the central bank conducts its QEP aggressively
and the private sector recognizes that the monetary base will permanently increase by
way of JGB purchases, the private sector comes to expect government debt interest
payments to decline over time, consequently reducing the private sector’s tax burden
(Auerbach and Obstfeld [2005]). This channel has not been verified empirically. To
realize positive interest rates while maintaining a permanent increase in the monetary
base after the economy returns to normal would require high nominal economic
growth by way of massive inflation. The reason for not verifying this channel may be
that it is deemed unrealistic to try to convince the private sector of this scenario. 
2. Verification method and results
As a premise for examining whether the portfolio rebalancing effect exists, this paper
looks into the demand for the real monetary base under zero interest rates. Under 
the QEP, if the interest rate elasticity of demand for the real monetary base becomes
infinite when short-term interest rates are zero, the monetary base will be passively
absorbed regardless of the amount provided, and thus effects from an increase in the
monetary base cannot be expected. In this regard, Kimura et al. (2003) use data from
1978/I to 2002/I and, with the reservation that data under the zero interest rate
period are not necessarily sufficient and any conclusions should be treated as prelimi-
nary, they reject the null hypothesis that the interest rate elasticity of demand for the
real monetary base becomes infinite when short-term interest rates are zero.
Oda and Ueda (2005) and Kimura and Small (2006) explicitly analyze the existence
and magnitude of the portfolio rebalancing effect. While both try to grasp the effect on
premiums included in financial assets that are imperfect substitutes for the monetary
base, the question of exactly which premium will be affected is not within the scope 
of their analyses.
Oda and Ueda (2005) conduct regression analysis on the risk premium component
of the yield curve (see Section II.A for the methodology) that was extracted in Baba 
16 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MARCH 2007et al. (2005) by using variables that denote the CABs at the BOJ and the magnitude of
the BOJ’s outright purchases of the long-term JGBs as explanatory variables. Based on
data from 1995/I to 2003/IV, they find that the regression results for three-, five-, and
10-year rates were statistically insignificant for the BOJ’s CABs.
On the other hand, Kimura and Small (2006) examine the existence of portfolio
rebalancing effects through changes in the supply and demand of financial assets based
on the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).
22 Specifically, they express the difference 
in risks reflected in the rate of return of each financial asset as the differences in para-
meter   (the sensitivity of each financial asset’s return against the market portfolio’s
return). The market portfolio consists of the monetary base, equities (the Nikkei Stock
Average), foreign government bonds (the yen-U.S. dollar exchange rate), high- and
low-grade corporate bonds, and long-term JGBs. They alter the composition of the
market portfolio by way of changes in the CABs through the BOJ’s market operations,
and consider that portfolio rebalancing exists if the risk premiums of individual 
financial assets change, reflecting the change in their supply and demand. Using data
from January 2000 to March 2004, they conduct regression analysis with changes 
in the risk premiums of individual financial assets’ yields as dependent variables and 
the CABs at the BOJ as an explanatory variable, and find that the credit spread of 
high-grade corporate bonds narrowed in a statistically significant manner. They 
interpret that the spread narrowed because investors, in order not to raise their 
portfolio risk, increased their demand for financial assets with countercyclical returns
such as JGBs. However, even when the CABs were increased by ¥10 trillion, the 
credit spread of Aa-grade corporate bonds narrowed only by 1–4 basis points. They also
conclude that an increase in the CABs decreased the forward exchange risk premium
somewhat once the indirect effect through implied volatility is taken into account, while
their estimations of the direct effect on the risk premium present mixed results.
23
Takeda, Komaki, and Yajima (2005) conduct studies that focus on the liquidity 
premiums of JGBs. They appraise the finite difference among the one-year forward
rates of JGBs at each future point as marginal changes in term premiums, and statisti-
cally test whether these declined before and after the change of policies. They conclude
that, at least at the time of the adoption of the QEP in March 2001, the decline in 
liquidity premiums was statistically significant. 
Sadahiro (2005) focuses on the effects on the foreign exchange rate. By using
monthly data from March 2001, when the QEP started, to September 2004, he 
conducts regression analysis on the effect of the Japan-U.S. monetary base ratio on the
yen-dollar exchange rate, and confirms that the effect was statistically insignificant.
Consequently, as shown in Table 2, the prior studies present mixed results as to the
effect of portfolio rebalancing on JGB yields. The effect on financial assets other than
JGBs is found to be statistically significant in the case of high-grade corporate bonds.
The findings on the effect on the foreign exchange rate are split between some effect
and no effect. As a whole, even in the analyses that detect the portfolio rebalancing
effect to a certain extent, this effect was smaller than the effect of the commitment on
17
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22. The details of the CAPM are explained in chapter 1 of Cochrane (2001).
23. It should be noted that, for assets with procyclical returns, the risk premium on equities and the credit spread of
low-grade corporate bonds increased in a statistically significant manner. the JGB yield curve if one considers the magnitude of the portfolio rebalancing effect
in the context of the CABs increasing by ¥28 trillion (about seven times) and the
monetary base increasing ¥46 trillion (an approximately 70 percent increase) over the
five-year period of the QEP. In addition, it should be noted that the analyses which
find no effect on the JGB yield implicitly presume that there would be little effect on
other financial assets without actually measuring them, because the effects on the JGB
yield serve as the starting point for spreading the effects to other financial assets. 
Let us now proceed to review the empirical evidence on the QEP’s signaling effect
for future monetary easing. Oda and Ueda (2005) conduct regression analysis on the
effect of the zero rate commitment on the expected future path of the short-term
interest rate component of the yield curve, using variables that express the CABs and
long-term JGB operation as explanatory variables, and find that for each of the three-,
five-, and 10-year bond yields, the coefficient of the CABs is statistically significant
with the correct sign. Specifically, the effect of a ¥10 trillion increase in the CABs is 
0.19 percent for the three-year bond yield and 0.17 percent for the five-year bond
yield. From this result, they draw the tentative conclusion
24 that the increase in the
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Note: In exact terms, Sadahiro (2005) uses the monetary base instead of the BOJ’s CABs as an 
explanatory variable.
Table 2  Portfolio Rebalancing Effect and Signaling Effect of Increase 
in the BOJ’s CABs 
Portfolio rebalancing effect
JGBs High-grade Foreign Stocks Low-grade Signaling



































































24. Oda and Ueda (2005) caution that the strength of the signaling effect depends on the extent to which the private
sector precisely understands the monetary policy stance in the zero interest rate environment in advance. In 
addition, they refer to the possibility that the signal was generated by a different communication path as the CAB 
targets were changed, for example, such as by the BOJ Governor’s comments at regular press conferences, and state
that the validity of the tentative conclusions requires further verification.CABs during the QEP period may have made the private sector recognize more 
firmly the policy duration effect whereby the BOJ would continue monetary easing
for years to come. 
On the other hand, Fujiki, Okina, and Shiratsuka (2004) conduct a case study
about the effect of the BOJ’s decisions to increase the CAB target in April, May, and
October 2003 and January 2004 on the yield curve, using the euroyen Tokyo
Interbank Offered Rate (TIBOR) and the yen swap interest rate. They conclude that
while the May 2003 decision affected the expectations of market participants, no clear
effects could be detected in the other cases. 
As a whole, empirical analyses show that, when the BOJ increased the CAB targets,
there were some phases in which this brought about a signaling effect (Table 2). The
existence and magnitude of a signaling effect seems to depend on the extent to which
the private sector understands precisely in advance the commitment to maintain the
zero interest rate. Even in cases where the commitment to maintain the zero interest
rate may not be believed at the beginning, once the private sector becomes certain about
the policy stance through comments at press conferences or an increase in the CABs,
then changes in the CAB targets may not have any additional signaling effect.
C. Effects of Altering the BOJ’s Asset Composition
1. Theoretical channels from purchases of long-term JGBs, and verification
In the process of continuing the QEP, the BOJ purchased long-term JGBs, asset-backed
securities, and other assets (Table 3). Of these, the largest item in terms of both the
amount of holdings and the amount of increase was long-term JGBs. The BOJ
increased purchases of long-term JGBs whenever it considered it necessary to smoothly
meet the CAB target (see the Appendix), and this resulted in substantial changes to the
BOJ’s asset composition (Figure 6).
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(High)Like the consequences from expanding the BOJ’s balance sheet, changes in the
BOJ’s asset composition will have no effect if the above-mentioned irrelevance propo-
sition holds true. However, if the BOJ directly purchases financial assets that are 
imperfect substitutes for the monetary base in exchange for CABs, this might have
some effect on the economy by affecting the premium component of financial assets’
yields. This point needs to be checked by examining empirical evidence. Of course, the
nature of the risk to be absorbed differs depending on which asset the BOJ actually 
purchases. For example, of the various measures shown in Table 3, the purchase of 
corporate debt means the central bank directly absorbs the credit risk premium. This
section focuses on the effect from increased purchases of long-term JGBs, whose 
magnitude of purchases by the BOJ was the largest.
One of the portfolio rebalancing channels that stems from the exchange of 
monetary base for long-term JGBs is the effect of increasing liquidity in the financial
market. Long-term government bonds are generally perceived as very highly liquid
assets. However, Goodfriend (2000) shows that when the private sector uses long-
term government bonds as collateral for external finance, their collateral value is lower
than when more liquid cash is used, and that the bondholders are exposed to the
increased risk of capital loss when long-term interest rates are already sufficiently low,
thereby increasing their cost of sale. Therefore, he states that massive open market
purchases of long-term government bonds by the central bank could have the effect of
reducing liquidity premiums. This paper now examines whether the increase in the
purchase of long-term JGBs by the BOJ actually led to a reduction in the premiums 
of JGB yields.
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Source: Bank of Japan.It should be noted that considerations of a channel whereby the central bank’s 
purchases of specific financial assets affect the supply and demand of imperfect sub-
stitute assets and thereby reduce premiums are based on the segmented market 
hypothesis, that is, the understanding that economic entities have different preferences
with respect to the maturity composition and types of financial assets. If the yields 
of the long-term JGBs purchased by the BOJ are significantly disconnected from 
the yields of JGBs with different maturities or those of corporate bonds, a decline in
long-term JGB yields will not spread over to the yields of other financial assets, 
and thus significant economic effects may not occur (Bernanke and Reinhart [2004]).
This point will also be examined in the analysis of the effects on financial assets other
than JGBs.
Additionally, this paper examines the empirical evidence of the signaling effect of
increased purchases of long-term government bonds on expectations regarding the
future course of monetary policy. However, the signal cannot be determined in one
direction a priori. One possibility is that if the central bank increases its purchases of
long-term government bonds, the credibility of expectations that zero interest rates
will be maintained would be enhanced since the central bank would then incur capital
losses if it did not continue the low interest rate policy for the foreseeable future
(Clouse et al. [2003]). However, taking into account the relationship with fiscal 
policy, there could be other possibilities. For example, Fujiki, Okina, and Shiratsuka
(2001) estimate that, even starting with the BOJ balance sheet before the QEP was
adopted, if one assumes that the BOJ purchases ¥60 trillion of long-term JGBs and
long-term interest rates reach 5 percent as a result of economic recovery, the BOJ would
incur a capital loss of about ¥12 trillion if it sold the purchased long-term JGBs in
1–2 years.
25 In addition, they point out the possibility that if the BOJ tries to absorb
the monetary base after exiting from deflation by way of selling government debt, the 
private sector’s holdings of government debt could increase given the amount of 
capital loss the BOJ would incur when selling. Given the need to bear in mind these
various possibilities, in the following, if any signaling effect is detected, its content
must also be examined in light of the empirical evidence.
2. Verification method and results
To begin with, the effects of the BOJ’s increased purchases of long-term JGBs on
financial assets’ premiums are estimated in Oda and Ueda (2005) and Kimura and
Small (2006). As previously mentioned, Oda and Ueda (2005) conduct a regression
analysis against the risk premium component of short- to medium-term interest rates,
using variables that denote the BOJ’s CABs and the magnitude of outright purchases
of long-term JGBs as explanatory variables. As explanatory variables of the BOJ’s 
outright purchases of long-term JGBs, they use the share of JGBs held by the BOJ in
total JGBs outstanding and the amounts of long-term JGBs purchased by the BOJ,
and obtain results that both variables are not statistically significant for all cases—
three-year, five-year, and 10-year JGBs.
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25. It should be noted that, in the current BOJ balance sheet, the duration of the long-term JGBs the BOJ holds is
considerably shorter than the original maturity of 10 years and the timing to sell the bonds has not been predeter-
mined. Therefore, the results of Fujiki, Okina, and Shiratsuka (2001) need to be interpreted with some discount
in that the actual level of capital loss differs substantially depending on the assumptions.On the other hand, Kimura and Small (2006) use the same CAPM model as 
previously explained in discussing the effects of the increase in the BOJ’s CABs while
changing the explanatory variable from the BOJ’s CABs to the balance of the long-term
JGBs held by the BOJ, and estimate the effects on financial assets’ risk premiums. 
The results, similar to those in the case of having the BOJ’s CABs as the explanatory
variable, are that the credit spread of high-grade corporate bonds narrowed in a 
statistically significant manner, while the magnitude is small at 6–8 basis points for 
Aa-grade corporate bonds from a ¥10 trillion increase in the purchase of long-term
JGBs. In addition, they conclude that the increased purchases of long-term JGBs 
somewhat decreased the forward exchange risk premium when the indirect effect
through the influence on implied volatility is taken into account, while estimations of
the direct effect on the risk premium present mixed results.
26
Consequently, portfolio-rebalancing effects by way of an increase in the purchase
of long-term JGBs (Table 4) are not detected on JGB yields. Some effects are detected
on other financial assets, while the magnitude is small compared with that which the
commitment exerted on JGB yields. In addition, it should be noted that the analyses
that found no effect on JGB yields implicitly presume that there would be little effect
on other financial assets, because the effects on JGB yields serve as the starting point
to spread the effects to other financial assets.
With respect to the effects of the BOJ’s increased purchases of long-term JGBs on
expectations for the future course of monetary policy, Oda and Ueda (2005) conduct
a regression analysis against the effect of the zero rate commitment on the expected
future path of short-term interest rates within the yield curve, using the BOJ’s CABs
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Table 4  Portfolio Rebalancing Effect and Signaling Effect from Increased Purchases
of Long-Term JGBs 
Portfolio rebalancing effect
JGBs High-grade Foreign Stock Low-grade Signaling











































a certain phase 
in the opposite 
direction (inflation
expectation)
26. On the other hand, they find that the risk premium on equities and the credit spread of low-grade corporate bonds
increased in a statistically significant manner.and the amount of long-term JGBs purchased as explanatory variables. They find the
coefficient of long-term JGBs purchased is not necessarily statistically significant, with
the opposite sign. 
Takeda, Komaki, and Yajima (2005) use finite differences according to the maturi-
ties of JGB forward rates, and find that premiums, including the inflation premium,
temporarily increased in a statistically significant manner centering on the longer-
term maturities of 7–8 years only when the BOJ increased its purchase of long-term
JGBs from ¥400 billion per month to ¥600 billion per month in August 2001. They 
interpret this result as implying the possibility that the market expected that the
increase in the purchase of long-term JGBs would lead to a loss of fiscal discipline and
thereby fostered inflation expectations.
As such, no empirical evidence to date has verified that the BOJ’s increased pur-
chases of long-term JGBs had any effect on strengthening expectations for monetary
easing (Table 4). 
III. Effects of the QEP on Macro Financial and 
Economic Variables
So far, this paper has examined the effects of the QEP separately according to trans-
mission channels. Here, the effects of the QEP on Japan’s economy overall are examined
by linking the various transmission channels analyzed above.
A. Effects on Stabilizing Financial Markets
1. The relationship between the financial system and aggregate demand/prices,
and verification
Corporate balance-sheet adjustments after the bursting of the bubble and, as the other
side of the same coin, the nonperforming-loan (NPL) problem of financial institu-
tions that led to insufficient functioning of financial intermediation, are considered to
be major factors behind the prolonged stagnation of Japan’s economy that began in
the early 1990s and lasted until about 2003. In particular, after the failures of
Yamaichi Securities and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank in November 1997, financial
institutions’ funding costs surged amid the rapidly heightened uncertainty regarding
financial institutions’ management (Figure 7).
It has been pointed out that from the end of 1997 to 1998 nominal GDP declined
amid a credit contraction. There were phases in which firms had heightened uncertainty
regarding their funding over fear that financial institutions were reducing lending due 
to liquidity concerns, and the economy was at risk of tumbling into a deflationary 
spiral (Hayakawa and Maeda [2000] and Bank of Japan [2000]).
27
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27. Specifically, empirical analyses show that the following two channels were at work. First, the decline in business
fixed investment can be attributed to financial institutions’ becoming extremely cautious in their lending stance
toward firms, especially small and medium-sized firms (Motonishi and Yoshikawa [1999]). Second, even those
firms that were not facing funding constraints experienced intensified uncertainty regarding the investment envi-
ronment in view of the heightened financial system uncertainty, and thus deferred their business fixed investments
to some extent (Bank of Japan [1998]).Subsequently, the economy slowed down again in early 2001, an event that was
triggered by the bursting of the IT bubble worldwide while Japan’s NPL problem had
not yet been resolved. In addition, financial institutions’ core capital declined again,
reflecting the decline in stock prices toward 2002, which became a destabilizing factor
for financial institution management (Figure 8). 
If the liquidity constraints of financial institutions had intensified during this
period, the effects might not have remained at the level of financial institution manage-
ment. Developments could have affected the lending stance of financial institutions
and, if many firms felt the risk that the financial system instability experienced in
1997–98 might recur, such firms might have become reluctant to lock in their funds
in the form of business fixed investment.
28 In addition, if firms were likely to face
funding constraints in the future, they would face the risk of being unable to take
advantage of profitable investment opportunities in the future, and might have found
it preferable to invest current cash flows in liquid assets and defer their business
fixed investment.
29
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Three-month TIBOR – three-month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)
Three-month TIBOR – three-month financing bill
Negotiable certificate of deposit (60–90 days) – three-month financing bill
Sources: Bloomberg; Bank of Japan.
28. This view can be derived from applying real option theory when investment has both irreversibility and uncertainty.
See Dixit and Pindyck (1994). 
29. This line of thinking under concerns over future liquidity constraints was introduced in Hori, Saito, and Ando
(2004).Therefore, in examining the QEP’s effects on stabilizing the financial system, the
viewpoint of whether the QEP forestalled such spillovers into the real economy is
important. Bearing this in mind, this paper now examines empirical analyses focusing
exclusively on what direct effects the QEP had on financial institutions and financial
markets. As the transmission channels of the effects, one could apply the hypothesis
presented in King (2002) that when the central bank provides more money than 
necessary for households and firms to conduct smooth economic activity consistent
with the current level of income, this provision of liquidity service by money reduces
the transaction costs not only of goods but also of financial assets in the financial 
market, thereby mitigating the cash-flow constraints of the private sector. While the
theoretical interpretation of this hypothesis is yet to be established, it could be 
considered as one of the portfolio rebalancing effects in the future. In addition, one can
think of a transmission channel whereby the commitment to maintain the QEP reduced
the possibility of future funding risk from occurring and thus reduced risk premiums. 
In the meantime, some note the channel whereby, as the QEP flattens the yield
curve, financial institutions that conduct short-term funding and long-term investment
can make little profit out of maturity transformation, thereby exerting side effects on
25
Effects of the Quantitative Easing Policy: A Survey of Empirical Analyses










CY 1985 = 100
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Land price (in six large cities, 
business area)
Nikkei 225 Stock Average
CPI (excluding fresh food)
Note: CPI is adjusted to exclude the effects of consumption tax hikes.
Capital Gains/Losses
Percentage of nominal GDP
Land Stock
1986–90 365.3 1986–89 147.2
1991–2004 –260.0 1990–2004 –89.6
Note: Nominal GDP is 1995 base previous to and including 1995 and 2000 base for the
ensuing years.
Sources: Cabinet Office, “Annual Report on National Accounts”; Ministry of Internal
Affairs and Communications, “Consumer Price Index”; Japan Real Estate
Institute, “Real Estate Indexes”; Nihon Keizai Shimbun.the banking system (IMF [2003]). However, empirical analyses have not yet been 
conducted on this aspect because, through the periods after the adoption of the QEP,
the profits of financial institutions actually depended substantially on changes in the
credit costs that had arisen due to the NPL problem.
2. Verification method and results
Of the qualitative analyses that dealt with the QEP’s effects on dispelling the liquidity
concerns of financial institutions, by comparing the changes in policy actions with 
the developments in financial markets, Baba et al. (2005) assess that the QEP pre-
vented the generation of risk premiums when financial institutions raised funds in
financial markets, and avoided recurrence of the liquidity crisis that occurred during
1997–98. In addition, Suzuki and Kobayashi (2005) conclude that the BOJ’s ample
liquidity provision to the market had a preventive effect on financial institutions’
funding concerns.
While a few studies measure quantitatively the QEP’s effects on the funding costs of
financial institutions, Babaet al. (2006) report that during the QEP phase the dispersion
of issuance rates of negotiable certificates of deposit (NCDs) by major banks (city banks
and trust banks), the volume of which accounts for about 30 percent of their market 
funding needs, fell to or below the level of October 1997, when the difference in credit-
worthiness among individual banks drew little attention. They also pool the single-year
data of the NCD credit spreads
30 for 1997, 1999, 2002, 2004, and 2005 (up to the 
beginning of May), respectively, and run regressions of the credit spreads on dummy 
variables corresponding to sample banks’ credit ratings for each year to estimate credit
spreads for each credit rating category (credit curves). The results show that the slope of
the credit curve started to flatten after introduction of the ZIRP in 1999 and maintained
this trend under the QEP, almost flattening out in 2004–05, indicating that the differ-
ences in credit ratings were then barely reflected. Furthermore, after controlling for 
the difference in creditworthiness by the spread of the bank bond yield over the yield of
JGBs with the same maturity, they conduct a panel analysis to estimate to what extent
monetary policy-related variables have contributed to the behavior of individual 
financial institutions’ NCD issuance rates. The findings indicate that the introduction
of both the ZIRP and the QEP were statistically significant, and that clarification of 
the commitment was sometimes statistically significant, although minor. While the
BOJ’s CABs were not statistically significant as an explanatory variable, the maturity
length of the BOJ’s bill-purchasing operations was statistically significant. While these
results do not imply the changes in the credit risks that represent the solvency of 
financial institutions, it may be interpreted that credit risks in a broad sense were reduced
in that funding risks were mitigated by the clarification of the BOJ’s stance to continue 
providing ample liquidity. Therefore, Baba et al. (2006) conclude that the BOJ’s 
commitment to policy duration had the effect of reducing the credit spread, and that 
the lengthening of the BOJ’s operation maturity might have had some effects.
Fujiki and Shiratsuka (2001) use the relationship whereby the stronger the demand
for liquidity, the lower the profitability of securities with short maturity and the steeper
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30. They defined the credit spread for a bank as the interest rate on NCDs issued by the bank with each maturity (less
than 30, 60, and 90 days) minus the weighted average of the uncollateralized overnight call rate over all banks. the slope of the yield curve, and consider the effects on financial institutions’ liquidity
constraints during the ZIRP period. Specifically, they find that the term spreads of
euroyen (1–3 months) in terms of the difference over overnight interest rates shrank
markedly during 1999–2000. From this observation, they conclude that, by way of 
the policy duration effect, the range of zero interest rate financial assets that were 
substitutes for the monetary base expanded and thus increased liquidity substantially,
and this resulted in mitigating the liquidity constraints of financial institutions. Since
the range of financial assets that were substitutes for the monetary base further
expanded under the QEP compared with the ZIRP period, it is possible to assume that
this liquidity effect remained in place. 
B. Effects of Raising Aggregate Demand and Prices
1. Generation mechanism of continuous price declines, and verification
This section analyzes the extent to which the QEP, after exerting effects to contain the
risk of a deflationary spiral stemming from financial system instability (as shown in
the previous subsection), is considered to have further contributed to raising Japan’s
aggregate demand and prices based on empirical analyses. 
While a decline in productivity also contributed to the prolonged stagnation of
Japan’s economy after the 1990s, a drop in the natural rate of interest due to negative
demand shocks seems to have played a major role in the modest but continuous price
decline over that time.
31 Corporations’ prolonged suffering from their balance-sheet
adjustments may also be described as a situation in which the economy lagged in 
its response to negative demand shocks, or in which negative demand shocks were 
continuously imposed on the economy. This paper now examines the extent to which
the QEP exerted its easing effect and raised aggregate demand and prices under this sit-
uation where the impact from the decline in Japan’s natural rate of interest 
continuously affected the economy.
Since the verification results differ depending on which QEP transmission channel
is measured, this paper considers three types of approaches: (1) measuring broadly 
without specifying the transmission channel; (2) measuring the effects in shifting 
the yield curve downward, mainly bearing in mind the policy duration effect; and 
(3) measuring the effects of an increase in the monetary base, mainly bearing in mind the
portfolio rebalancing effect. Here, this paper comprehensively captures the effects on the
economy, including the direct effects on aggregate demand and price expectations that
could not necessarily be measured by the approach of assessing the transmission channel
in terms of the effect on financial asset yields adopted in Section II.
2. Verification method and results
a.Verification that broadly measures the effects of the QEP
This subsection begins by introducing a study that does not specify the transmission
channel of the QEP, but rather broadly grasps and measures the QEP’s effects on Japan’s
economy. The merit of this approach is that it avoids underestimating the policy effects
resulting from imposing in advance too strong a constraint on the transmission channel,
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31. Another interpretation of deflation is that it will persist under zero interest rates even if the natural rate of interest
continues to be positive (a “deflationary trap”) (Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe [2002] and Iwamoto [2005]).and enables one to gauge the QEP’s comprehensive effects on the economy, not only
including those through such transmission channels as the commitment or the changes
in the yields of various financial assets, but also conceptually incorporating other 
channels such as even the positive effect of dispelling the funding anxieties of the 
financial institutions. 
Kamada and Sugo (2006) try to identify changes in the policy stance by using,
instead of the uncollateralized overnight call rate, private banks’ financial intermediary
function represented by the combination of lending rate and lending attitude, which
are “intermediate variables” not directly influenced by the zero bound constraint on 
the policy rate, as a monetary policy proxy that distills the various transmission chan-
nels of monetary policy. They approximate the monetary policy proxy to economic 
performance during 1978–95, a period in which short-term interest rates were not 
faced with the zero bound constraint, and then extrapolate this to the following 
period. They find that, as a result of the BOJ’s various policy responses as short-
term interest rates could not be reduced below zero, the monetary policy proxy can be 
considered as negative if converted to the overnight call rate after the adoption of 
the QEP. This can be interpreted as indicating that corporate financing during that
time was that accommodative. 
They next use five variables—the CPI, industrial production, the foreign exchange
rate, the 10-year JGB yield, and the monetary policy proxy—and conduct vector
autoregressive (VAR) analysis
32 to identify changes in the policy stance, by attaching
minimum theoretical constraints on the monetary policy proxy and the foreign
exchange rate to capture policy effects broadly without limiting transmission channels.
When they calculate the impulse responses of prices and production against monetary
easing, the policy effects decline as they include the QEP period at the end of 
the data sample (Table 5). In addition, when they estimate the point of structural
change generated in the monetary policy transmission channel,
33 they find structural






































Table 5  Effects of Policy Stance Change under a Zero Bound Constraint on Interest
Rates (VAR Analysis)
32. More strictly, they used the sign-restriction VAR model. See Uhlig (2005) for details. 
33. They apply a Bayesian statistics method called the Markov chain Monte Carlo method to the sign-restriction VAR
in their verification.change around the end of 1990, which corresponds to the peak of the asset price 
bubble, but identify no subsequent structural changes. When they conduct a counter-
factual simulation by combining monetary easing after the bursting of the asset 
price bubble with the VAR model that described Japan’s economy before the bursting,
the result indicates an increase in prices. From this, they conclude that, in addition 
to the zero bound constraint on interest rates and the erosion of banks’ financial 
intermediary functions, the worsening of corporate balance-sheet problems and the
breakdown of the mechanism which amplifies economic activity limited the effects 
of monetary easing. 
b.Verification measured from the effects of lowering yield curve
As previously shown, the analyses that verified the policy duration effect as the QEP’s
transmission channel found that the QEP had the effect of flattening the yield curve.
This apparently recognizes that an accommodative environment had been generated
in terms of the extent of corporate financing. While the effects on aggregate demand
and prices were mixed, as shown below, in general more papers find that the QEP did
not lead to raising aggregate demand and prices because of insufficient functioning of
financial intermediation and corporate balance-sheet adjustment.
For example, Okina and Shiratsuka (2004) and Baba et al. (2005) argue that,
although the QEP lowered the yield curve mainly through the policy duration effects,
its effects on prices and the economy were limited. Similar reasons are cited in both
studies. Based on the observation that the implied forward rate for longer terms did
not rise, Okina and Shiratsuka (2004) conclude that the QEP did not have the effect
of reversing the financial market’s expectations that deflation would persist. They say
this is because the transmission mechanism from lender to borrower was blocked and
the monetary easing effect did not spill over to outside the financial system. Babaet al.
(2005) show, by way of structural model analysis, that the reduction of net assets of
both lenders and borrowers raised funding costs through information asymmetry
between them,
34 and interpret that this offset the effects of lowering the yield curve. 
At the same time, however, as discussed in Section II.A, they point out the possibility
that the effect of the commitment on lower interest rates contributed to produce some
higher inflation expectations when viewed from a long-term perspective, since this
lowering effect was lower for 10-year bonds than for three- and five-year bonds. 
On the other hand, Suzuki and Kobayashi (2005) made a positive assessment about
the monetary easing effect by showing that, with the combination of the zero policy
interest rate and the policy duration effect, long-term real funding rates declined 
centering on the manufacturing industry from 2002 and the lending attitude of 
financial institutions became accommodative, which was effective to a certain extent in 
raising firms’ funds demand, with some lag. However, they do not separate the effects
of lowering the policy interest rate to zero percent and the policy duration effects.
c.Verification measured from the effects of the monetary base increase
Sections II.B and II.C showed that the effects through the transmission channels of
the increase in the BOJ’s CABs and the increase in the purchase of long-term JGBs
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34. This effect is referred to as the financial accelerator (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist [1999]). For an analysis of
Japan’s prolonged stagnation using this effect, see Fuchi, Muto, and Ugai (2005).were mixed in terms of statistical significance and small, if any, compared with the
effects of the commitment. However, as long as the detected effects depend on how
the transmission channels are specified, the overall assessment of the effects needs to
be made upon examining the relationship between increases in the BOJ’s CABs and
the monetary base vis-à-vis aggregate demand and prices. In this regard, when viewing
the development of financial and economic indicators as shown in Figure 9, amid 
a substantial increase in the monetary base the growth of M2+CDs was relatively
small, and the growth of real GDP and the CPI even smaller. This subsection now
summarizes the empirical analyses that rigorously treat the relationships between such
financial quantitative indicators and economic indicators. 
Verification of effects that do not factor in the policy regime change
Before the QEP was adopted, it was often argued that if the BOJ were to expand its
monetary base, the money stock (M2+CDs is the representative indicator in Japan)
would increase, and deflation would be stopped. Tracing the background logic of this
argument, it seems that the argument is based on the following quantity equation,
which replaces the transaction amount with GDP.
MV = PY,
where M = money, V = velocity, P = prices, and Y = real GDP.
This view interprets that the quantity equation shows causality, in that when M is
increased, P orY rises or increases stably. Typically, the argument starts by conducting
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Sources: Cabinet Office, “Annual Report on National Accounts”; Ministry of Internal
Affairs and Communications, “Consumer Price Indexes”; Bank of Japan.a regression on M2+CDs using the monetary base, the declining trend of the money
multiplier (M2+CDs/monetary base), and the lending attitude of financial institu-
tions, and, upon showing that the monetary base is statistically significant as an
explanatory variable, then estimates a function whereby nominal GDP/M2+CDs
explains the inflation rate, and concludes that an increase in the monetary base 
would raise inflation via the money stock (Shinpo [2002]).
35 In addition, there is an
empirical analysis based on the VAR model that shows that among money stock, bank
lending, and funding other than that from banks, money stock has the largest effect
on economic activity (Harada and Okamoto [2004]).
However, Woodford (2003) presents an influential view that the money quantity
equation shows the state of economic equilibrium, and not causality as described above;
and that therefore money could not affect prices independent of interest rates under 
a specific monetary policy even if one takes into account the mechanism whereby
money reduces transaction costs. From this standpoint, even if there were a stable 
relationship between an increase in the money stock and economic activity when 
interest rates are positive, this relationship would disappear once interest rates become
zero. Consequently, to accept that the quantity equation shows causality and monetary
easing which increases money stock is effective, one must assume that the relationship
between the monetary base and money stock, and their relationship with nominal
GDP, would in fact be stable when the monetary base is intentionally increased under
zero interest rates. However, the data used in the studies here, covering fiscal
1974–2000 in Shinpo (2002) and 1980/I–2001/IV in Harada and Okamoto (2004),
are long-term time-series data and hardly cover the periods of the ZIRP and QEP. 
So assessment of the stability of the relationships among the monetary base, money
stock, and nominal GDP under the QEP must await further data accumulation.
Also, when looking at empirical analyses on the stability of the relationship between
the monetary base and money stock, many studies conclude that the relationship 
was unstable under zero interest rates. For example, the Bank of Japan (2002) shows
that the monetary base and the money stock are not linked by a fixed rate to begin 
with, that especially under an environment where interest rates are close to zero, 
the cash/bank deposits ratio and the BOJ’s CABs/bank deposits ratio both fluctuate
substantially, and that the money multiplier also becomes unstable and fluctuates in an
unpredictable manner. Kuttner (2004) also judges, by viewing the developments
between M2+CDs and the BOJ’s CABs (the operating variable of the QEP) or the
monetary base, that the link between them was weak.
In addition, many results show that the relationship between the money stock 
and economic activity has weakened. With respect to M2+CDs,
36 for example,
Kuttner (2004) states that if the long-run relationship is extended between M2+CDs
and real GDP and prices measured from before 1990 until 2004, the relationship 
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35. There are arguments that go further to propose that the price level could be raised if the BOJ determines the
amount of the monetary base to increase and adjusts the CABs to realize that amount (Hetzel [2004]).
36. With respect to narrow money (M1), while Miyao (2002) and Fujiki and Watanabe (2004) show that money
demand for interest rate levels has been unstable under an extremely low interest rate environment, they nevertheless
conclude that the usefulness of velocity is not lost if one uses the function in the form of double-log specification
that depicts both money demand and interest rates in logarithms.still exists, although it becomes weak. On the other hand, Bank of Japan (2003) 
verifies a long-run equilibrium relationship among real M2+CDs, real GDP, and the
opportunity cost of holding money using the vector error correction model (VECM)
based on two sets of data from 1971 forward and from 1981 forward, and notes that
the long-run equilibrium relationship was not identified if data since the end of 1997,
when financial system concerns rapidly heightened, were included. In addition,
Miyao (2005) conducts a rigorous verification with respect to the long-run equilib-
rium relationship between M2 and economic activity. He shows that the long-run
equilibrium relationship does not hold among M2, real GDP, and prices, and also that
M2 does not have the power to forecast real GDP, the GDP deflator, or nominal GDP
if data during 1993–2003 are used.
37 As to why the relationship between the money
stock and economic activity has become fragile, several reasons have been pointed out:
the NPL problem and progress of corporate restructuring (Miyao [2005]), financial
system uncertainty with heightened precautionary demand for currency on the part of
households and firms, and the substantial decline in the opportunity cost of liquidity
service provided by M2+CDs under zero interest rates, which induced a substantial
funds shift among financial assets (Bank of Japan [2003]).
As such, much empirical evidence indicates that the relationships between the
monetary base and money stock, and between the monetary base and nominal GDP,
have been extremely unstable, at least when interest rates were zero.
Verification of effects that factor in the policy regime change
This paper now proceeds to examine the analyses that explicitly factor in the changes of
policy regime under the zero bound constraint on interest rates. Especially in the recent
analyses, VAR models that take into account changes of policy regimes under the zero
bound constraint on interest rates are being adopted to extract objectively from the data
the relationships among the monetary base, the real economy, and the inflation rate.
Three specific examples are cited below (see Table 6 for a list of the results).
Kimuraet al. (2003) use four variables—the CPI rate of change, the GDP gap, the
monetary base rate of increase, and the overnight call rate—and estimate a VAR
model
38 with time-varying coefficients for the sample period of 1971/II–2002/I. They
find that the impulse response to an increase in the monetary base was in the direction
of an inflation rise as of 1985 (II), while there was no response against either the infla-
tion rate or the GDP gap as of 2002 (I). Based on these findings, they conclude that,
given the structural changes in the economy under a zero bound constraint on interest
rates, they could not extract a function whereby the monetary base channel raised
prices or the economy.
Fujiwara (2006) tries to grasp the policy effects using a VAR
39 analysis that does fac-
tor in a structural break in monetary policy effects, but does not impose constraints 
a priori on the timing of such a break. Specifically, he uses monthly data from 1985–2004
and conducts analyses using three variables—the CPI, industrial production, and 
the monetary base—and then using four variables, adding the new issuance rate for 
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37. Sugiharaet al. (2000), while based on data up to the ZIRP period, also find similar instability of money demand. 
38. They use a Bayesian VAR model.
39. They use the Markov switching VAR model.10-year JGBs. The analyses using three variables suggest a regime change before and
after 1998. The impulse responses of the economy and prices to an increase in the 
monetary base declined from 1998, and the confidence interval shows that they then
became statistically insignificant. The analyses using four variables suggest a regime
change around 2000, which is close to the time of the adoption of the QEP. The 
economy and prices responded in a positive direction and the long-term interest rate
in a negative direction, but these developments became statistically insignificant after
2000. From these results, Fujiwara (2006) concludes that the increase in the monetary
base had, under zero interest rates, some slightly positive effects on the economy and
prices to an extent that is statistically insignificant, and that such effects became 
considerably smaller after the regime change occurred under zero interest rates.
Sadahiro (2005) conducts VECM analysis that factors in the long-term equilibrium
relationship among variables exclusively for the period deemed to face a zero bound
constraint on interest rates. Specifically, for six variables—the Japan/U.S. monetary
base ratio, the yen/U.S. dollar exchange rate, the Japan/U.S. inflation rate differential
(the difference between the Corporate Goods Price Index rate of change and the
Producer Price Index rate of change), the Japan/U.S. short-term interest rate dif-
ferential, the Japan/U.S. industrial production index ratio, and the money multiplier,
he estimates an error correction model using the monthly data during January
1996–September 2004. The impulse responses of the inflation rate and industrial 
production to the increase in the monetary base through this model were that pro-
duction does increase although the magnitude is minimal, and the inflation rate
responds in a negative direction. From these results, Sadahiro (2005) concludes that 
the effectiveness of the increase in the monetary base was lost during the period when
interest rates were zero. 
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Table 6  Effects of an Increase in the Monetary Base under the Zero Interest Rate
Constraint (VAR Analysis)There is another study that analyzes what effects other than lowering short-term
interest rates can be observed in the economy and prices if the central bank actively 
provides a monetary base greater than that which equilibrates with the current 
economic activity level (hereafter, the difference between the two is referred to as “excess
money”). Kimuraet al.(2003) use a structural model that incorporates the transmission
channels explained in Section II.B. They show that the explanatory power of such
excess money (the difference between the real monetary base growth and the long-run
desired growth rate) on the GDP gap has been extremely unstable. When regression
analysis of the aggregate demand curve is conducted by gradually extending the 
measurement period, the relationship is positive in a statistically significant manner for
data up to 1997 and up to about 2000, while it becomes statistically insignificant for
data up to 1998–99, and would become negative if data after 2001 were included. Even
in cases where values are positive, the size of the parameters is considerably smaller than
in previous studies in the United Kingdom and United States. When looking at the
explanatory power of excess money (the difference between the real monetary base and
that consistent with monetary equilibrium) on the inflation rate, statistically significant
positive parameters are obtained for data up to approximately 1997, while the 
parameters become small as data after 1997 are included, and become almost zero when
data up to 2002/I are included. Consequently, Kimuraet al.(2003) tentatively conclude
that the effects of an increase in the monetary base are very uncertain and small, 
if any.
The analyses introduced here present many cases in which effects indicating that
an increase in the monetary base raises the real economy, the inflation rate, and price
levels have not been identified, or are small. As for the reasons why, studies that 
find few portfolio rebalancing effects interpret that the effects of an increase in the
monetary base are small to begin with. However, studies that do not deny the possi-
bility of effective portfolio rebalancing—for example, Horiuchi (2004) and Kimura
et al. (2003)—interpret that the limited effects of monetary policy reflect such factors
as the insufficient recovery of the financial intermediary function, although monetary
policy and prudential policy staved off its further deterioration, and the structural
adjustment in the corporate sector that was still underway. In particular, Horiuchi
(2004) emphasizes the point that financial institutions which faced critical situations
triggered by the NPL problem were reluctant to extend loans.
IV. Concluding Remarks
This paper has reviewed the effects of the BOJ’s QEP. The preliminary conclusions
obtained from this survey of empirical analyses can be summarized in the following
four points. 
First, as for the transmission mechanism of the effects of the QEP, empirical 
analyses clearly confirm the effect of the commitment that the expectation that the
zero interest rate would be maintained for some time into the future lowered the yield
curve, centering on the short to medium term (the policy duration effect). This also
implies that the commitment policy secured market confidence. In addition, the 
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lowering the yield curve than the ZIRP, which committed to future dispelling of 
deflationary concerns. 
Second, the effects from expanding the BOJ’s balance sheet (expansion of the
monetary base) through an increase in the BOJ’s CABs and the effects from altering
the BOJ’s asset composition through increased purchases of long-term JGBs can be
assessed in line with the transmission channels as follows. The empirical analyses 
present mixed results as to whether the portfolio rebalancing, which affects the 
premium portion of the yields of financial assets that are imperfect substitutes for 
the monetary base, had any effect on narrowing the premium portion of bond yields, 
and even among those that detect such an effect, many generally conclude that the
magnitude of this effect was smaller than that from the commitment. With respect to
the signaling effect, which affects the private sector’s expectations for the future path
of short-term interest rates, at least the effect from an increase in the BOJ’s CABs on
bolstering expectations that the monetary easing would continue into the future was
detected during certain phases. On the other hand, no such effects were identified
from increased purchases of long-term JGBs, and, in one phase, inflation premiums
temporarily increased. 
Third, bearing these points in mind and taking up studies that empirically 
analyze the QEP’s overall macroeconomic impact on Japan’s economy through various
transmission channels, many of these analyses in general observe that the QEP created
an accommodative monetary environment. Looking at the contents of the macro-
economic impact, while the transmission channels are not specified, these macroeco-
nomic analyses verify that because of the QEP, the premiums on market funds raised
by financial institutions carrying substantial NPLs shrank to the extent that they 
no longer reflected credit rating differentials. According to analyses of the economic
situation during this period, if firms had heightened anxieties regarding their funding
over fear of the stability of the financial system, further deterioration of economic 
and price developments resulting from the likes of deferring their business fixed 
investment might have occurred. Therefore, this observation implies that the QEP had
the effects of maintaining financial market stability and an accommodative monetary
environment by removing financial institutions’ funding uncertainties, and thereby 
preventing further deterioration of the economy reviewed above.
Fourth, as for the QEP’s effects in raising aggregate demand and prices, the effects
solely from increasing the monetary base under the zero bound constraint on interest
rates were not detected or were small, if any, compared with the periods without 
the zero bound constraint on interest rates. When gauging the effects of the QEP
broadly, many studies show that the QEP had a greater monetary easing effect than
that stemming from merely lowering the uncollateralized overnight call rate to zero
percent, while the effects of raising aggregate demand and prices nevertheless turned
out to be limited. Analytical results and interpretations are presented to indicate 
that, in addition to the zero bound constraint of the interest rate, major roles were
played by the substantial decline in responsiveness to monetary easing on the part of
corporations and financial institutions resulting from their deteriorated core capital
due to a plunge in asset prices.
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that works on the expected future path of short-term interest rates. This result 
suggests that when a central bank conducts monetary policy with due recognition of
the zero bound constraint on interest rates, information dissemination concerning
monetary policy from the central bank to the private sector is critical to manifesting
the policy effects. 
Regardless, empirical analyses on the channels and magnitude of the QEP’s effects
are still not sufficient. It is expected that with many additional studies the validity 
of the preliminary conclusions presented here will be scrutinized from various 
angles in the future. This paper now ends by listing several issues that deserve further
empirical studies.
The first is the portfolio rebalancing effects. This survey did not find that these
effects were strongly manifested. However, this area has yet to find a consensus of
macroeconomic understanding, and thus lacks sufficient empirical analyses. For
example, there has been no empirical verification that as the BOJ’s CABs increased,
the yields on financial assets abroad declined by way of the carry trade utilizing yen,
with extremely low funding costs, or that the real estate-related securities market was
affected, and the transmission channels are not theoretically clear. As represented by
these examples, whether the QEP had subtle and broad-based effects on various asset
markets awaits the accumulated results of further studies. 
The second issue is the multifaceted examination of the commitment effect.
According to the classification of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), even when an
economy has tumbled into a liquidity trap, the central bank’s credible commitment to
effecting economic recovery substantially in the future when the natural interest rate
turns positive is theoretically expected to raise aggregate demand and prices through
four channels: (1) by stimulating current spending even when current nominal inter-
est rates face a zero bound constraint by maintaining nominal interest rates at a lower
level for longer in the future than would normally be expected; (2) by stimulating 
current spending by reducing real interest rates by generating inflation expectations; 
(3) by stimulating current spending from expectations that future income will increase;
and (4) expectations that the inflation rate will rise in the future make it less likely for
current prices to fall. While empirical analyses on the policy duration effect have
focused especially on channel (1), studies have not quantitatively clarified the extent to
which each of the other channels that does not especially mediate financial markets was
effective. In addition, the extent to which the actual commitment diverges from the
theoretical optimal commitment, which is derived from the magnitude of the demand
shock and price shock to the economy and the structure of Japan’s economy,
40 would be
an important, contentious issue in assessing the effects of the commitment policy.
The third issue is to what extent the QEP could have been effective if Japan’s 
economy had not gone through a substantial decline in asset prices and the associated
erosion of core capital and risk-taking ability on the part of corporations and financial
institutions, as witnessed during the 1990s to early 2000s. While we have begun to see
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40. Oda and Nagahata (2005) examined the costs and benefits of maintaining zero interest rates by committing only
to inflation rates in relation to the magnitude of demand and price shocks.such studies as Kamada and Sugo (2006) recently on this question, their number is
still extremely few. In considering policy measures when short-term interest rates face
a zero bound constraint in the course of the normal business cycle, it is essential to
have studies that explicitly differentiate the effects stemming from the QEP, structural
adjustment, and the zero bound constraint on interest rates.
The fourth issue concerns the significance of normal financial transactions becom-
ing unprofitable under the QEP. In this regard, market practitioners have often noted
that declines in transactions in the short-term money market and declines in the
credit spreads of corporate bonds influence the efficiency of resource allocation.
41
On the other hand, some consider such phenomena to be transitory adjustment costs
while financial schemes are unable to adapt to a zero interest rate environment
(Bernanke and Reinhart [2004]). There have been almost no empirical analyses from
these viewpoints, and the accumulated results of future studies are awaited.
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To prevent prices from
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The main operating 
target for money market
operations changed from
the uncollateralized
overnight call rate to the
outstanding balance of
the current accounts at
the BOJ.
From an average of 
¥4 trillion to around 
¥5 trillion.
Should there be a risk 
of financial market 
instability, the BOJ will
provide ampler liquidity
irrespective of the 
guideline above.
From around ¥5 trillion




Increase from ¥400 
billion per month.
From ¥400 billion per
month to ¥600 billion per
month.
Others
Committing that the QEP
continues to be in place
until the CPI (excluding
perishables) registers
stably a zero percent or
an increase year on year.
—
The BOJ’s view on economic activity and prices
Present: Japan’s economic recovery has recently come 
to a pause. 
Prices have been showing weak developments.
Outlook: The economy will likely remain stagnant for 
some time.
There is concern about an increase in downward pressures
on prices stemming from weak demand.
Present: Economic adjustments are deepening. 
The CPI continues to be somewhat weak.
Outlook: Adjustments in economic activities will continue
for the time being.
Attention should be paid to the risk of adjustments in 
economic activities spreading even further, and the risk of a
negative impact on the economy induced by developments
in foreign and domestic capital markets.



















































































To secure proper 
functioning of financial




To secure that the 
financial markets 
continue to work in a 
stable manner and to
ensure that economic
recovery will be 
effectively supported.
A possibility that liquidity
demand will increase 
further with the end of a 
fiscal year approaching.
To take all possible 
measures to secure the
financial market stability.








From around ¥6 trillion
to above ¥6 trillion.
From above ¥6 trillion to
around ¥10–15 trillion.
Providing more liquidity
to meet a surge in
demand towards the 
end of a fiscal year 
irrespective of the 
target of CABs.
From around ¥10–15 tril-






From ¥600 billion per
month to ¥800 billion per
month.
From ¥800 billion per
month to ¥1 trillion 
per month.
From ¥1 trillion per
month to ¥1.2 trillion 
per month.
Others
Reduction in the official
discount rate from 0.25
percent to 0.10 percent. 
Increase in the 
maximum number 






Extending the days 
to apply the official 








The BOJ’s view on economic activity and prices
Present: Adjustments in economic activity are becoming
more severe. 
The CPI is weakening.
Outlook: Adjustments in economic activity will possibly 
be prolonged. Attention should be paid to the growing 
risks of a negative impact on the economy induced by
developments in foreign and domestic capital markets. 
The possibility that weak demand will further intensify
downward pressure on prices warrants careful monitoring.
Present: The economy is deteriorating broadly. 
The CPI is weakening.
Outlook: The economy will inevitably continue to deteriorate
for a while. Continuous attention should be paid to 
the risk of a negative impact on the economy induced by 
developments in foreign and domestic financial markets.
The possibility that weak demand will further intensify
downward pressure on prices warrants careful monitoring.
Present: The economy continues to deteriorate.
The CPI is declining somewhat faster.
Outlook: The economy will continue to deteriorate, but 
the pace is expected to moderate gradually. Continuous
attention should be paid to the risk of a negative impact 
on the economy from developments in foreign and 
domestic financial markets.
The possibility that weak demand will further intensify
downward pressure on prices warrants careful monitoring.
Present: The economy has stopped deteriorating but has
not yet shown clear signs of recovery.
The CPI remains on a gradual downtrend.
Outlook: The economy will gradually form foundations for
recovery. Prospects for the economy have been facing
increasing uncertainties.
The CPI is expected to stay on a declining trend for the time























































against Iraq will affect
the economy, and stand-
ing ready to make every







that injection of capital
into Resona Bank was
necessary.




To promote smooth 
corporate financing.





From around ¥15–20 tril-
lion to around ¥17–22
trillion from Apr. 1.
(Due to the establish-
ment of the Japan Post)
From around ¥17–22 tril-
lion to around 
¥22–27 trillion.
From around ¥22–27 tril-












Acceptance of a broader




commercial paper as 
eligible  collateral.
As a temporary measure,
the Bank will apply the
official discount rate 
to the Lombard-type 
lending facility on any
business day.
Decided to accept loans
on deeds to the Industrial
Revitalization Corporation
of Japan with govern-
ment guarantee as 
eligible collateral.
—
Decided the outline 
of the scheme for 
outright purchases of
asset-backed securities.
The BOJ’s view on economic activity and prices
Present: The economy has stabilized as a whole, but there
is still substantial uncertainty toward recovery.
The CPI remains on a gradual downtrend.
Outlook: The foundations of Japan’s economic recovery will
gradually be made firmer. The downside risk continues to
require attention.
The CPI is expected to stay on a declining trend for the time
being at the current gradual pace.
Present: Economic activity remains flat.
The CPI has been declining gradually.
Outlook: The momentum for a recovery will be initiated. The
downside risk continues to require attention.
The pace of year-on-year decline in the CPI is expected to
become somewhat slower.
Present: Economic activity remains flat.
The CPI has been declining gradually.
Outlook: The momentum for a recovery will be initiated.
More uncertain factors warrant careful monitoring. 
The pace of year-on-year decline of the CPI is expected to
become somewhat slower.
Present: Economic activity remains flat but uncertainties
about future prospects have recently been increasing.
The CPI has been declining gradually.
Outlook: The momentum for a recovery will be initiated,
although there is greater uncertainty.
The year-on-year decline in the CPI is projected to remain
around the April level.
Present: Economic activity remains virtually flat as a whole.
The rate of decline in the CPI has diminished.
Outlook: The momentum for a recovery will be initiated,
although there continues to be substantial uncertainty.
The CPI is projected to continue falling at the current 





























































































To enhance liquidity 





From around ¥27–30 tril-
lion to around 
¥27–32 trillion.
From around ¥27–32 tril-










Extension of the maturity








thinking on the conduct
of monetary policy and
the evaluation of the
developments of the
economy and prices 
in a more timely and
lucid manner.
More detailed descrip-
tion of the commitment
to maintaining the QEP.
Modification of the 
conditions regarding 
the purchases of 
asset-backed securities.
Introduction of the 
securities lending facility
to provide the markets
with a secondary source
of Japanese government
securities.
The BOJ’s view on economic activity and prices
Present: The foundation for a gradual recovery is being laid.
The year-on-year rate of decline of the CPI diminished.
Outlook: The economic recovery will gradually gather
momentum. It is expected to take some more time before 
a self-sustaining recovery in domestic demand gains
momentum.
The CPI is basically projected to continue falling gradually.
Present: The economy is recovering gradually.
The year-on-year rate of change in the CPI has been close
to zero percent.
Outlook: The economy is anticipated to continue 
recovering, although the pace of recovery is expected 
to remain moderate.
The CPI is projected to be on a slightly declining trend.
Present: The economy continues to recover gradually, 
and domestic demand is becoming firmer.
The year-on-year rate of change in the CPI has been close
to zero.
Outlook: The economy is expected to gain further 
momentum gradually, as it continues to recover moderately.



















































Judged that the 
conditions laid out 
in the commitment 
are fulfilled.
BOJ CABs
When it is judged that
liquidity demand is
exceptionally weak, 
there may be cases
where the balance of 
current accounts falls
short of the target.
Change the operating
target of money market
operations from the 
outstanding balance 
of current accounts 





overnight call rate 
to remain at effectively
zero percent.
The outstanding balance
of current accounts at
the BOJ will be reduced







at the current amounts




Introduction of a 
new framework for 
the conduct of 
monetary policy.
Review of the Bank’s
thinking on price 
stability.
The Lombard-type lend-
ing facility’s loan rate will
remain at the current
level, and the temporary
waiver of add-on rates
for frequent users of the
facility will also be 
maintained.
The BOJ’s view on economic activity and prices
Present: The economy continues a recovery trend.
The CPI has been declining slightly on a year-on-year basis.
Outlook: The economy is expected to continue to recover.
The CPI is projected to continue falling slightly on a 
year-on-year basis.
Present: The economy continues to recover steadily.
Year-on-year changes in the CPI turned positive.
The year-on-year rate of increase in the CPI rose 
in January.
Outlook: The economy is expected to be a sustained 
recovery.
Year-on-year changes in the CPI are expected to remain
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